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Social Entrepreneurship and Social Transformation:  
An Exploratory Study 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
This study provides a comparative analysis of seven cases of social entrepreneurship that have 
been widely recognized as successful.  The paper suggests factors associated with successful 
social entrepreneurship, particularly with social entrepreneurship that leads to significant 
changes in the social, political and economic contexts for poor and marginalized groups.  It 
generates hypotheses about core innovations, leadership, organization, and scaling up in 
successful social entrepreneurship.  The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications for 
the practice of social entrepreneurship, for further research, and for the continued development 
of support technologies and institutions that will encourage future social entrepreneurship. 
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Introduction 
 
The concept of entrepreneurship, long hallowed in the context of business and economic 
ventures, has been increasingly applied to the context of social problem solving (e.g., Dees, 
1998a; 1998b; Thake & Zadek, 1997; Emerson & Twersky, 1986).  The challenges of finding 
effective and sustainable solutions to many social problems are substantial, and solutions may 
require many of the ingredients associated with successful innovation in business creation. 
 
But solutions to social problems, such as sustainable alleviation of the constellation of health, 
education, economic, political and cultural problems associated with long-term poverty, often 
demand fundamental transformations in the political, economic, and social systems that underpin 
current stable states.  The test of successful business entrepreneurship is the creation of a viable 
and growing business, often embodied in the survival and expansion of a business organization.  
The test of social entrepreneurship, in contrast, may be a change in the social dynamics and 
systems that created and maintained the problem – and the organization created to solve the 
problem may get smaller or less viable as it succeeds.   
 
While the concept of social entrepreneurship is relatively new, initiatives that employ 
entrepreneurial capacities to solve social problems are not.  We have found a variety of 
initiatives – particularly focused on the problems of poor and marginalized populations – that 
have transformed the lives of thousands of people around the world.  The practice of social 
entrepreneurship may be well ahead of the theory – as in other areas of social action. 
 
This paper seeks to identify factors associated with successful social entrepreneurship, and 
particularly with social entrepreneurship that leads to significant changes in the social, political 
and economic contexts for poor and marginalized groups; in other words, social entrepreneurship 
that leads to social transformation. We begin with a brief description of different perspectives on 
social entrepreneurship and the working definition that has guided our analysis of an informal 
sampling of seven cases.  We then describe our methods of inquiry and the issues we used to 
focus attention across the seven cases.  The next section reports the results of comparisons across 
the cases, and formulates hypotheses about core innovations, leadership, organization, and 
scaling up in successful social entrepreneurship.  The final section discusses implications for the 
practice of social entrepreneurship, for further research, for the continued development of 
support technologies and institutions for future social entrepreneurship. 
 
 
  
 
 
Background  
 
 
The concept of entrepreneurship has a long history in the business sector.  A major theme has 
been the creation of value through innovation. (Schumpeter, 1951; Drucker, 1985).  As applied 
more recently to social concerns, the concept has taken on a variety of meanings.   
 
Some, for example, have focused on social entrepreneurship as combining commercial 
enterprises with social impacts.  In this perspective, entrepreneurs have used business skills and 
knowledge to create enterprises that accomplish social purposes in addition to being 
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commercially viable (Emerson and Twersky, 1996). Not-for-profit organizations may create 
commercial subsidiaries and use them to generate employment or revenue that serves their social 
purposes, or for-profit organizations may donate some of their profits or organize their activities 
to serve social goals. These initiatives use resources generated from successful commercial 
activities to advance and sustain their social activities. 
 
Others have emphasized social entrepreneurship as innovating for social impact.  In this 
perspective, attention is focused on innovations and social arrangements that have consequences 
for social problems, often with relatively little attention to economic viability by ordinary 
business criteria (e.g., Dees, 1998b).  Social entrepreneurs are focused on social problems, and 
they create innovative initiatives, build new social arrangements, and mobilize resources in 
response to those problems rather than the dictates of the market or commercial criteria.   
 
Still others see social entrepreneurship as a way to catalyze social transformation well beyond 
the solutions of the social problems that are the initial focus of concern.  From this perspective, 
social entrepreneurship at its best produces small changes in the short term that reverberate 
through existing systems to catalyze large changes in the longer term (Ashoka Foundation, 
2000).  Social entrepreneurs in this tradition need to understand not only immediate problems but 
also the larger social system and its interdependencies, so that the introduction of new paradigms 
at critical leverage points can lead to cascades of mutually-reinforcing changes that create and 
sustain transformed social arrangements.  Sustainable social transformations include both the 
innovations for social impacts and the concern for ongoing streams of resources that characterize 
the other two perspectives on social entrepreneurship – and they also lead to major shifts in the 
social context within which the original problem is embedded and sustained.   
 
While we believe that all three approaches to social entrepreneurship have considerable utility, 
we are particularly interested in the perspective that emphasizes social entrepreneurship as a 
catalyst for social transformation in this study.  So, more specifically, this study focuses on social 
entrepreneurship that creates innovative solutions to immediate social problems and also 
mobilizes ideas, capacities, resources, and social arrangements required for long-term, 
sustainable, social transformations. 
 
Before exploring a broad number of social entrepreneurship cases that vary in location, size, and 
focus, we chose a small group of cases to give us some initial data with which we could begin 
generating hypotheses.  These cases are widely recognized as meeting the above social 
entrepreneurship definition – they are all innovative efforts to solve persistent social problems of 
poverty and marginalization that to some extent have been successful in scaling up their impacts 
and at least potentially catalyzing social transformation.  In comparing the cases, we have 
focused in particular on four aspects of their experience: the nature of the innovations they have 
articulated, the characteristics of their leaders, the organization of the initiatives, and the paths 
chosen for scaling up their impacts.   
 
First, most definitions of social entrepreneurship emphasize the innovative character of the 
initiative.  In comparing the cases, we will examine the nature of the innovation in some detail.  
Not all provision of goods and services amounts to social entrepreneurship, of course.  In many 
cases, replication or expansion of existing services is a valuable solution to a social problem – 
but not one that necessarily requires social entrepreneurship.  When the resources or capacities to 
duplicate existing services for poor and marginalized groups are not available, creative initiatives 
that reconfigure existing resources or services for more effective or wider delivery are imperative 
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to serve wider populations (e.g., Uphoff, Esman, and Krishna, 1997, 1998).  Such creative 
initiatives represent social entrepreneurship.  We will be interested in the patterns of innovation 
that appear across cases: Is there a single pattern for success?  Are there a variety of forms of 
innovation that appear to be associated with different kinds of problems or contexts? 
 
Second, we will look closely at the characteristics of leadership of socially entrepreneurial 
ventures.  Much of the literature on leadership focuses primarily on individuals and their 
personal skills or attributes (e.g. Gardner, 1995; Heifetz, 1994), and certainly in Western 
experience, particular individuals have made major contributions to entrepreneurial ventures.  On 
the other hand, in some contexts, leadership groups may be more important than individuals, and 
focusing primarily on individuals may obscure essential aspects of the initiative (Paul, 1982; 
Thake & Zadek, 1997).  We believe that leadership – whether group or individual -- is important 
in the success of social entrepreneurial ventures.  What are characteristics of leaders who found 
entrepreneurial social ventures?  How do they respond to the challenges that emerge over time 
and as the initiative grows? 
 
A third set of issues for investigation is the organizational and institutional features of social 
entrepreneurship.  Substantial evidence suggests that as initiatives face the challenges of 
expansion of their impact and sustaining their initiatives, their organizational and institutional 
features are important factors (Tendlar, 1989; Paul, 1982; Uphoff et. al. 1998).  We will examine 
the organizational and institutional aspects of successful initiatives to see if we can identify 
common patterns.  To what extent are there “best practices” that appear across many different 
cases?  How do initiatives expand their operational capacities or evolve their strategies in the 
face of shifting task and environmental challenges? 
 
Finally, we are also interested in the paths by which entrepreneurial ventures expand and sustain 
their impacts and transform larger systems in which they are embedded.  Some studies of 
expansion of development impacts suggest that routinizing technology (Tendlar, 1989) is critical 
to reaching larger constituencies, or that carefully crafting a sequence of gradually expanding 
projects and programs are critical to successful scaling up. (Rondinelli, 1983)  Others suggest 
that a menu of different patterns for scaling up impacts can be identified, and that the key issues 
in scaling up involve organizing to fit the strategy chosen (Uvin, 1995; Uvin, Jain and Brown, 
2000).  To what extent are different approaches to scaling up visible across the cases?  Are there 
patterns of scaling up that are particularly associated with success in catalyzing long-term 
changes in social arrangements that shaped and sustained the initial problems?   
 
 
 
Methodology 
 
This study provides a comparative analysis of cases of social entrepreneurship that have been 
widely recognized as successful.  This study seeks to identify patterns and regularities across 
successful initiatives.  It is a hypothesis-generating rather than a hypothesis-testing approach to a 
complex and not yet well-understood topic.  Comparative analysis of cases can be a useful way 
of generating hypotheses about phenomena that combine complex phenomena, long-term 
dynamics, and difficulties in access (Yin, 1984).  Case descriptions provide the kinds of 
information that allow recognition and assessment of unexpected patterns that would not be 
captured by more constrained methodologies.  The cost of such richness and flexibility is the 
increased difficulty to make systematic comparisons or to draw unambiguous conclusions. 
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The cases used in this study are drawn from existing literature and descriptions.  The decision to 
use existing descriptions limits our ability to gain precisely comparable data and also subjects us 
to the biases of multiple observers.  Since the costs of collecting original data for a study that 
spans four continents would be very high, we are willing to accept these limitations for a 
hypothesis-generating study.   When similar patterns emerge in diverse cases, we can be more 
confident that those patterns are relatively robust.  In our analysis of the cases described here, we 
will use tables and matrices to enable comparison across cases, a tool used extensively in 
multiple case analysis (Yin, 1984; Miles and Huberman, 1994).  We will focus particularly on 
patterns that seem to characterize many or most of the cases. 
 
We generated information about the cases from published and unpublished reports, internet 
resources, and interviews with organization members and informed observers.  We first used 
these data to identify patterns related to our four areas of interest in each case, and then 
constructed matrices that allowed us to compare patterns across cases. The results of this process 
should be considered as tentative concepts and hypotheses.   
 
The cases were chosen to meet the several criteria.   
• They are widely regarded as successful examples of social entrepreneurship on behalf of 
poor and marginalized communities.   
• They come from diverse regions, including Asia, Africa, Latin America, and North America.   
• They have been described in available literature sufficiently to answer our key questions. 
• They have exhibited at least some potential for catalyzing transformations in the social 
contexts within which they have been implemented. 
 
Table 1 provides a brief overview of the cases and their impacts as background to the analysis in 
later sections. More detailed data will be presented in the context of the discussions of particular 
concerns in the next section. 
 
Table 1.  The Social Entrepreneurship Cases 
 
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) was established in 1972 by Fazel Abed, a Bangladeshi 
corporate executive, in the aftermath of the Independence War.  Over the past 30 years, BRAC has focused on  
breaking the cycle of poverty in Bangladesh.  Starting as a relief and resettlement organization, BRAC pioneered the 
development of comprehensive, locally-organized approaches to rural development and poverty alleviation.  It has 
provided a range of services– rural capacity-building, education, health services, micro-credit—to 2.6 million rural 
people, and it has been exceptionally successful in developing projects that contribute to its own financial 
sustainability. 
• Essential Innovation: Focus on local constituent needs and capacities through a systemic approach to poverty 
alleviation that emphasizes systematic learning at many levels. Rapid scaling up of the organization while 
ensuring sustainability 
• Scope: Operates in 60,000 of the 86,000 villages in the country, organizing the poor for self help and building 
local capacities for income generation, health, and education. Emphasis on women and oppressed groups may 
fundamentally change local attitudes and culture for landless poor as well as economic circumstances 
The Grameen Bank (GB) was established in 1976 by Muhammed Yunus, a Bangladeshi economic professor, and 
his colleagues.  Convinced that poor borrowers might be good credit risks, they demonstrated that landless women in 
mutually accountable borrower groups achieved very high repayment rates.  The Grameen Bank forms small groups 
of five people to provide mutual, morally binding group guarantees in lieu of the collateral.  Participants have proved 
to be reliable borrowers and astute entrepreneurs, raising their status, lessening their dependency on their husbands 
and improving their homes and the nutrition of their children.  These borrowers developed the social development 
guidelines known as the “Sixteen Decisions”, the basis of village group meetings throughout the Grameen system.  
Today, over 90 percent of the millions of microcredit borrowers around the world are women. 
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• Essential Innovation: Group lending for poor peoples without collateral. Scale up an organization/expand 
organizational capacity to serve millions of small borrowers. 
• Scope: Provided small loans to 2.3 million very poor borrowers. Created 12 other businesses (e.g. fisheries, hand 
loom, renewable energy) to serve the poor. Catalyzed fundamental changes for poor women’s role in income 
generation as well as changes in micro-credit theory and practice around the world. 
The Green Belt Movement (GBM) was established in 1977 to encourage tree planting in Nairobi by Wangari 
Maathai and the National Council of Women in Kenya.  The Movement organized small groups of poor community 
members in both rural and urban settings to grow, plant and care for trees in “greenbelts” on public and private land.  
The Movement has organized more than 6,000 groups in poor villages and urban areas across the country and has 
planted over 20 million trees.  Over the last ten years, GBM has adopted a “conscientization” approach to mobilize 
community consciousness for self-determination, equity, improved livelihood and environmental conservation.  It has 
helped hundreds of grassroots leaders to advocate for social, economic and political justice.  Internationally, GBM 
has begun to facilitate a Pan African Network to help “green conscious”/social justice groups in other African 
countries develop similar approaches to community mobilization.  
• Essential Innovation: Grassroots mobilization, conscientization, and leadership development through 
environmental activities 
• Scope: Facilitated 20 million trees planted in Kenya (70% survival rate). Mobilized 50,000 Kenyan households 
to care for the environment and improve their own well-being. 
The Highlander Research and Education Center (HREC) was founded by Myles Horton in 1932 in a rural 
Appalachian mountain community in the Southern United States.  The Center is dedicated to eliminating poverty and 
promoting genuine democratic participation for all people. Highlander provides education and research support to 
grassroots individuals and organizations working to address the inequities rooted in the political, cultural, and 
economic structures of communities.  It began working with the labor movement, played a pivotal role in the Civil 
Rights movement, and has worked on other many other struggles in Appalachia and the Deep South.  It currently 
focuses on economic injustice and democratic participation in the U.S. and internationally. 
• Essential Innovation: Use adult education to help grassroots individuals and groups develop their own solutions 
to problems of political voice and local problem-solving. Turns over innovative programs to movement and 
becomes support organization to it. 
• Scope: Developed labor education programs that enabled American labor movements and in turn, international 
labor movements, to create political and economic policy changes. Developed leadership for civil rights 
movement (Southern Christian Leadership Committee and Student NCC): Citizenship School model trained 
thousands of blacks in literacy skills to gain voting rights and to participate in local communities. 
Plan Puebla (PP) was initiated in Mexico in 1966 by a small group of agricultural researchers who recognized that 
the needs of small subsistence farmers were not being addressed by Mexican agricultural research.  The initiative 
sought to improve maize production techniques and transfer this new technology to small subsistence farmers, in the 
hope of improving the general welfare of rural farm families.  The project gained momentum from support of the 
newly established International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center.  After 10 years, private funding of the 
initiative ended and the Mexican government took over the project.  The model has been replicated in Columbia, 
Peru, Honduras and other areas in Mexico, and the project has enabled the creation of the Cholollan Regional 
Cooperative, a credit union founded by former Plan Puebla staff in 1993, and, the Center of Rural Development 
Studies in Puebla.  
• Essential Innovation: Improve crop production through focusing on small, farmer-oriented cooperative and 
support activities (not simply rolling out of agricultural technology). 
• Scope: Increased maize production of 47,000 Mexican farmers in the Plan Puebla region by 62%. Educated poor, 
small farmers about income diversification; and facilitated a 252% increase in family income. 
 
 
The Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), founded in 1972 by Ela Bhatt, is a trade union of women who 
earn their livelihoods in three broad occupational categories that historically have been very difficult to organize: 
hawkers and vendors, home-based producers, and manual laborers and service providers.  Their initial programs 
focused on improving the working conditions of their members through influencing the actions of local police and 
policy makers.  Later, SEWA provided a variety of services that were otherwise unavailable to their members.  With 
approximately 315,000 members, SEWA is the first and largest trade union of informal sector workers.  In addition 
to it unionizing activities, SEWA has several “sister” institutions including a bank to provide financial resources, an 
academy to provide teaching, training and research, and a housing trust that coordinates housing activities for its 
members.  SEWA has become an international force, working with women’s and labor movements worldwide. 
• Essential Innovation: Organize women who are atomized and have little reason to cooperate for political change 
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and for addressing economic, social, and health issues. Build local leadership capacity to scale up organization 
and movement. 
• Scope: Organized 315,000 self-employed women as union members. Improved working conditions, access to 
health care, credit, savings for the more than 90% of India’s female labor force in the self-employed/unorganized 
sector. Influenced the creation of self-employment labor division in Indian government. Influenced ILO to pass 
standards for home workers (including minimum wage and working conditions). Co-founded international 
network to support the work of women in the informal sector (WIEGO). 
Se Servir de la Saison Seche en Savane et au Sahel (Six-S) is an association set up in 1976 by founders from 
Burkina Faso and France, Bernard Ledea Ouedraogo and Bernard Lecomte, to promote community development 
from a peasant perspective, especially in the dry season when jobs are few and far between.  Six-S has organized 
networks and councils of villagers in several West African countries.  After a village has worked with Six-S to 
develop an organization, started a savings program, and built management capacity, they can propose projects to 
solve local problems.  A council of representatives from the network of villages allocates project resources according 
to a few simple rules that reduce the likelihood of misuse of funds.  Six-S has negotiated arrangements for such 
“flexible funding” with a coalition of donors, who have been pleased with the results. 
• Essential Innovation: “Flexible Funding” for local projects approved by regional networks of village elders. 
Building-building to prepare villages for using resources effectively. Network-building within regions and 
countries to foster more information-sharing 
• Scope: Involved 2 million people involved village projects across 9 countries in the West African Sahelian 
region. Assisted villagers in 1,500 villages to develop self-sustaining income-generating projects. Organize 
6,500 village groups to strengthen village infrastructure and capacity for project development 
 
 
 
Patterns in the Cases 
 
This section examines the patterns identified across the seven cases across the four aspects of 
each initiative identified earlier: characteristics of innovations, characteristics of leaders, 
organizational arrangements, and scaling up approaches.  In the analysis that follows, we provide 
tables with brief descriptions of the characteristics of each case on the dimensions that emerged 
as important for each of these aspects.  We briefly discuss the concepts that emerge from this 
analysis and formulate initial hypotheses to describe the links between those factors and 
initiative success.  
 
Characteristics of Innovations 
 
The innovations described in Table 2 are very diverse.  They range from microcredit services 
provided by the Grameen Bank, to agricultural and tree-planting support from Plan Puebla and 
the Green Belt Movement, to support for grassroots social movements from SEWA and 
Highlander, to village development initiatives by BRAC and Six-S. It is not immediately obvious 
that these innovations have much in common, since they focus on different groups and concern 
quite different issues.   
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Table 2:  Innovation Characteristics 
 Core Innovation Pattern  Mobilizing Assets and  
Capacities of Poor 
Emphasis on Continuous 
Learning 
BRAC  Build Local Capacity: Create 
village groups that can solve 
local problems and provide a 
variety of services and supports 
for village development. 
High: Shift from relief and 
service delivery to building local 
organizations and capacities for 
self-help, with particular 
attention to women. 
High: Embrace commitment to 
being a learning organization 
very early; systems for learning 
from experience in place for 
individuals, programs, and the 
organization as a whole. 
Grameen 
Bank 
Micro-credit Package: 
Provide group-based loans for 
poor and marginalized people 
to develop income-generating 
activities; follow up with other 
development programs. 
High: Focus from the start on 
improving the capacity of poor 
and marginalized people, 
especially women, to participate 
in small businesses. 
Medium: Systematic 
investments in learning of 
participants and staff; less clear 
investment in formal learning 
processes at the organizational 
level. 
Greenbelt 
Move- 
ment 
Build Local Capacity: Use 
tree planting and civic 
education programs to build 
local skills and organization for 
self-help activities. 
High: Focus on building village 
level capacity to act together to 
solve problems, such as working 
together to remedy deforestation. 
Medium:  Substantial 
investment in learning by village 
groups and some in staff 
development; No major 
resources or commitment to 
organizational learning. 
High- 
lander 
Center 
Build Local Movement: Use 
adult education tools to 
empower and organize local 
unions, civil rights groups, and 
others to confront abusive 
elites. 
High: Use participatory adult 
education to help marginalized 
grassroots actors (e.g. labor, civil 
rights) organize and campaign 
effectively for their rights. 
Medium to High:  Commitment 
to staff and partner learning; less 
systematic investment in 
organizational learning.  
Plan 
Puebla 
Agriculture Package: Develop 
and spread improvements in 
maize production that enable 
subsistence farmers to improve 
their family welfare and 
increase income.  
Medium: Emphasize technology 
to improve agricultural 
productivity of small farmers, 
but further improvements 
depend on outside experts and 
resources. 
Medium: Staff and participating 
farmer commitment to learning 
about agriculture, but little 
investment in organizational 
learning.   Government takeover 
reduces future learning process.  
SEWA Build Local Movement: 
Mobilize self-employed women 
to campaign for policies to 
support work activities and to 
develop services adapted to 
their work and overall welfare 
needs. 
High:  Focus on building 
capacities of poor self-employed 
women to organize and secure 
economic and legal rights for 
themselves. 
High:  Emphasis on helping 
members learn new skills and 
political capacities; Long-term 
commitment to organizational 
learning and growth in a 
changing political context. 
Six-S Build Local Capacity: Support 
village projects to improve 
sustainable local resources, 
increase income-generating 
activities and build villager 
capacities through networking 
of village organizations. 
High: Provide non-financial 
resources for village groups and 
serve as intermediary between 
donors and village organizations 
that demonstrate initial 
effectiveness to secure financial 
resources for improvement 
projects. 
Medium: Invest in staff and 
village leader learning (esp. 
village organizational 
development and technical 
skills); Unclear investment in 
systematic learning at the 
network or Six-S organizational 
level. 
 
The first column of Table 2 contains a brief description of the basic form of the innovation.  The 
initiatives in the seven cases often built on their core innovations by adding other programs as 
they grew and evolved, but most began with a basic form that shaped their central identity.  This 
pattern of ongoing fidelity to an initial identity and frame has been observed in other civil society 
organizations (e.g., Ebrahim, 2001).  We have identified three such forms among these cases: 
building local capacity, disseminating a package, or building a movement.   
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Building local capacity involves working with poor and marginalized populations to identify 
capacities needed for self-help, and helping to build those capacities.  This approach is grounded 
in the assumption that local actors may solve many of their own problems given increases in 
local capacities.  Examples include the systemic village development programs of BRAC and 
Six-S and (less clearly) the Greenbelt Movement.  This approach involves working closely with 
local groups around issues that those groups deem important. 
 
Other innovations focus on disseminating a package of innovations that serve widely distributed 
need.  An underlying assumption of this approach is that information and technical resources can 
be reconfigured into user-friendly forms that will make them available to marginalized groups.  
Examples include the demand for small loans met by the Grameen Bank and the demand for 
improved maize technology met by Plan Puebla.  The construction of such packages may require 
considerable expertise and creativity to adapt existing materials and resources for low-cost 
diffusion to many users, but once that development work is done, relatively lowly trained 
resources may disseminate the package. 
 
A third approach has been building a movement that mobilizes grassroots alliances to take on 
abusive elites or institutions.  The assumption underlying movement building is that increased 
political voice of marginalized groups can help solve their major problems.  Examples include 
SEWA’s campaigns against police abuse of vendors and Highlander’s support for the union and 
civil rights movements.  Movement building is often a highly politicized activity that involves 
challenging powerful antagonists, and thus, may subject the initiative to high risks and repressive 
challenges. 
 
Over time, many initiatives added programs that supplemented the core innovation: the Grameen 
Bank added many other services to its micro credit package, and SEWA added capacity-building 
services to its movement building.  However, the initial core innovations of these seven cases 
reflected quite different analyses of the underlying problems and very different roles for the 
marginalized groups involved: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Successful social entrepreneurship initiatives can take at least three forms, 
including: 
! building local capacities to solve problems,  
! providing “packages” needed to solve common problems, and 
! building local movements to deal with other powerful actors. 
 
It is not a surprise, given our criteria for case selection, that these innovations focused on 
improving the lives of poor and marginalized groups.  It is striking, however, how much they 
focused explicitly on mobilizing existing assets of marginalized groups to improve their lives, 
rather than delivering outside resources and services.  Thus, in the second column of Table 2, we 
have rated and briefly described the extent to which the initiative focused on helping clients use 
their own assets to solve problems.  A rating of “high” reflects primary reliance on the assets and 
capacities of local actors for self-help; a rating of “medium” indicates emphasis on self-help 
combined with continuing outside resources; a rating of “low” indicates that outside resources 
and services are essential to improvements. All but one of these cases was rated “high” on 
mobilizing local assets.   
 
Mobilizing grassroots assets takes various forms in these initiatives.  Some focus on organizing 
village people and resources to solve local problems, like the work of Six-S and the Greenbelt 
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Movement on village development, and BRAC’s organization of poor groups to improve local 
services.  Others emphasize helping individuals or small groups participate more effectively in 
local economies, like the Grameen Bank and the Plan Puebla.  Still others, like SEWA and 
HREC, help grassroots groups organize themselves to be more effective in influencing other 
actors and political forces.  But to a large extent, they all treat the assets and capacities of the 
marginalized groups themselves as vital to the development initiative, thereby creating the 
necessity for sharing control and mobilizing resources with the local partners—without whose 
willing cooperation the initiative will fail—while increasing the likelihood of sustainable change 
because of its grounding in local commitment and capacities. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Successful social entrepreneurship involves innovations that mobilize existing 
assets of marginalized groups to improve their lives. 
 
The third column of Table 2 describes the initiatives’ emphasis on continuous learning by 
individuals and organizations. The issue of learning in development initiatives has received 
considerable attention (Korten, 1980; Uphoff et al, 1998).  Individual learning by staff and 
partners is clearly important if the initiative is going to improve its performance on complex 
projects. Organizational learning that goes beyond individual development to enhance 
organizational capacities is also critical to deal with the volatile and conflicted contexts of 
development (Argyris and Schon, 1978; Senge, 1990; Smillie and Hailey, 2001). The second 
column of Table 2 rates emphasis on learning as “high” for systematic investment in individual 
and organizational learning; “medium” for investment in individual or organizational learning; 
and “low” for little systematic investment in learning. Relevant individual and organizational 
learning varies considerably across these initiatives.  All the initiatives emphasize individual 
learning by their staffs and clients, as might be expected of organizations that are innovating in 
the face of complex problems.  Significant investment in organizational learning is less 
common, particularly when initiatives face problems of scarce resources and must struggle to 
make ends meet.  It is probably not coincidental that the initiatives characterized by high levels 
of organizational learning—BRAC, SEWA, and Highlander—all operate at a large scale or seek 
to influence others who operate on a large scale.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Successful social entrepreneurship initiatives emphasize systematic learning 
by individuals and by the organization, if they operate on a large scale.   
 
Characteristics of Leaders 
 
The founders of these initiatives come from rich and poor backgrounds, from industrialized and 
developing countries.  Some founders are individuals and some are teams; some are men and 
some are women.  They include lawyers, professors, managers and grassroots organizers.  There 
are not, in short, immediately obvious and highly visible characteristics that distinguish these 
leaders by background, country of origin, gender, occupation, or even as individuals or groups.  
What characteristics do emerge from comparison across these cases as being associated with 
successful social entrepreneurship? 
 
Table 3 presents summary data and ratings across the cases on two dimensions of leadership that 
seemed characteristic of successful social entrepreneurs in these cases: (1) bridging capacity, that 
enabled leaders to work effectively across many diverse constituencies, and (2) adaptive skills, 
that enabled them to recognize and respond to changing contextual demands over a long term. 
Note that we have reorganized the rows in Table 3 to reflect the characteristics of the three types 
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of innovations identified in the last section, so that it will be easier to identify characteristics 
associated with these different forms of core innovation. 
 
Table 3: Characteristics of Initiative Leadership 
 Bridging Capacity Adaptive Leadership Capacity 
Build Local Capacity 
BRAC High: Founder was international business 
executive who committed himself to work on 
poverty in his country.  Developed close 
contacts with grassroots communities and 
activists as well as with government officials, 
business leaders, donors, and development 
NGOs. 
High: Founder has led organization for 30 years, 
and guided transition from relief work to being a 
grassroots development catalyst, a partner with 
government and international coalitions, and a 
successful market competitor.  Founder 
understands political context and utilizes key 
political relationships effectively. 
Six-S High: Founding team of two development 
activists from France and Burkina Faso able to 
understand and work across North-South 
boundaries as well as with villages, donors, 
and governments. 
Moderate: Co-founders led organization for 15 
years and managed its building regional 
networks and instituting non-program based 
funding patterns with international donors.  
Managed political context to avoid sabotage.  
Data not available on leadership succession. 
Greenbelt 
Movement 
Moderate: Founder was biology professor 
who grew up in Kenyan village. Has good 
relations with grassroots groups, 
environmental activists, and international 
groups, but has had difficulty building broad 
coalitions for expanding impacts.  Founder 
has not maintained strong donor relationships. 
Moderate: Founder has led initiative for 30 
years, expanding organization to many villages, 
but hasn’t developed a large-scale strategy or 
organization to carry it out.  Uses key political 
relationships to maintain safety and subdue 
threats to organizational existence. 
Share Package 
Grameen 
Bank 
High: Founder was an economics professor 
who grew up in Bangladesh and completed 
graduate education in the United States.  Over 
the years, has built strong and lasting 
relationships with business leaders, 
government officials, donors, academics and 
poor villagers, both men and women.  
High: Founder in place for 30 years, and has led 
expansion from small, local experiment to 
nation-wide organization with branches in other 
countries, twelve different businesses, and close 
ties to government and international donors. 
Plan 
Puebla 
Moderate: Founding team of four young 
researchers worked with universities and 
farmers, but did not develop networks with 
broader constituencies.  Government officials 
with less bridging capacity succeeded them. 
Moderate to Low: Founders work for 10 years 
to successfully translate agricultural research 
results to small-scale farmers.  After private 
funding ended, founders were able to gain 
government support for program but 
discontinued their own involvement.  
Build Movement 
Highlander 
Center 
High: Founder grew up poor in rural 
Appalachia, but gained links to elite 
intellectuals via schooling and to international 
experience that inspired founding of 
Highlander to support grassroots self-help and 
advocacy.  Had few relationships with donors 
and depended on networks and colleagues to 
connect donors to the initiative. 
High: Founder led the initiative for nearly 50 
years and maintained involvement until his 
death.  Had strategic relationships with 
academics, social activists, union leaders, and 
political leaders.  Overcame multiple serious 
challenges to the survival of organization and 
campaigns from “Red Scare” anti-communists 
and segregationists. 
SEWA High: Founder born into high caste and 
trained as a lawyer in social activist family 
(e.g. India’s independence movement).  
Maintained relationships with elite officials, 
professionals and social activists while 
convening disparate groups of very poor self-
employed women around common issues. 
High:  Founder led organization for 25 years to 
be successful local and national movement, and 
then facilitated rise of new leaders and 
international association. Utilized relationships 
with key political leaders and government 
officials to support campaigns and to overcome 
challenges from opposing constituencies. 
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The first column of Table 3 rates and describes each initiative in terms of its leadership’s ability 
to understand the perspectives of and work effectively with constituencies whose concerns and 
resources were critical to the initiative.  In many cases, individuals have experiences and skills 
that enable bridging capacity with very diverse stakeholders; in others, the leadership is 
comprised of a team that together includes the necessary skills and resources.  We rated the 
leadership “high” when they could understand and work effectively with all the stakeholders that 
are central to the organization’s strategy; “moderate” if they had the skills to work with most key 
stakeholders; and “low” if they were ignorant of or at odds with stakeholders critical to their 
success.  While this aspect of leadership emerged from our examination of the cases, it is 
consistent with the challenges posed by settings in which success turns to effective dealing with 
many different constituencies (e.g., Brown, 1993; Moore, 2000). 
 
In most of these cases, the social entrepreneurs as individuals or groups had backgrounds and 
experiences that enabled them to build effective links with very diverse actors. The leaders of 
BRAC, SEWA and Grameen Bank, for instance, were members of national elites who were 
committed to work with marginalized groups; the founder of Highlander came from poor 
circumstances but gained access to elite constituents through education; the founders of Six-S 
had diverse backgrounds that enabled them collectively to understand and connect with very 
different perspectives.  The two initiatives whose leadership had less success in bridging diverse 
stakeholders had more difficulty in expanding the impacts of the initiative.  The founder of the 
Green Belt Movement has been challenged by tribal politics, tensions with government actors, 
and lack of long-term donor support.  The leadership team of Plan Puebla focused on building 
relationships with local farm communities, academic colleagues and targeted government 
officials, but their lack of relationships with a variety of outside donors or other development 
organizations resulted in reduced funding and an eventual government takeover that undermined 
many of their social change and community improvement goals. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Successful social entrepreneurship initiatives are often founded by leaders 
with the capacity to work with and build bridges among very diverse stakeholders. 
 
The second column of Table 3 focuses on the long-term adaptive capacity displayed by the 
leadership of these ventures in response to the changing contexts and circumstances.  Many of 
these leaders or teams expanded their own repertoires to provide new visions for growing 
organizations over many years. Some have also fostered leadership succession processes that put 
appropriate new talent in place.  Long-term adaptive capacity was rated “high” when leadership 
successfully catalyzed initiative adaptation to internal and external changes or organized 
successions to deal with challenges over the long periods required for scaling up these initiatives; 
“moderate” when they adapted with some difficulty to new organizational or contextual 
challenges; and “low” when their problems of adaptation or succession undermined the 
effectiveness or expansion of the initiative.  While this definition of adaptive capacity grew out 
of examination of these cases, the concept resembles aspects of leadership identified by analysts 
who have looked at the phenomenon in other contexts (e.g., Heifitz, 1994). 
 
The leadership of most of these initiatives exhibited impressive longevity. Five of the seven were 
led by their founders for 25 years or more, and even Six-S and Plan Puebla had the same 
leadership teams for 10 years of more.  Launching and expanding successful social 
entrepreneurship ventures is not a short-term effort.  The adaptive challenges facing these 
initiatives varied across forms of innovation.  For capacity building initiatives, many of the 
challenges involved evolving understanding of local development demands and the need to 
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create organizational arrangements and donor alliances to support expansion. BRAC was 
extremely successful in creating systems to deliver programs to thousands of villages over a long 
term.  It is less clear that Six-S and the Greenbelt Movement were able to create the kinds of 
long-term alliances needed to expand their impacts in the long term.  For innovations that 
focused on building development packages, the Grameen Bank was more successful than Plan 
Puebla in developing a package that could be disseminated widely over a long period.  In 
movement building initiatives, adapting effectively to political challenges was critical to long-
term effectiveness, and both SEWA and Highlander leaders were able to respond creatively to 
continuing political challenges.  Many initiatives adapted program components to fit their core 
innovations to emerging contextual challenges, such as Grameen’s partnering with non-Islamic 
women to teach Islamic women observing purdah; Highlander’s integration of blacks and whites 
in residential education programs in the teeth of local segregation laws; and SEWA’s addition of 
economic development and support services to its initial political organizing program.   
 
Each of the three initiatives whose adaptive capacity is rated moderate had difficulties in 
responding to a major contextual challenge.  Six-S groups, overwhelmed by an influx of funding, 
ignored necessary village capacity building processes and became too focused on quick 
successes and impacts valued by donors.  The Greenbelt Movement didn’t build the federations 
and coalitions required to address effectively the broader scale issues of government corruption.  
Plan Puebla didn’t demonstrate to government and other constituencies the importance of 
sustainable social change program components.   
 
Hypothesis 5: Successful social entrepreneurship initiatives have leadership that is 
characterized by: 
! Long-term commitment to the initiative; and 
! Capacity to catalyze adaptation to emerging contextual challenges. 
 
 
Organizational Arrangements 
 
The organizational arrangements of these initiatives vary considerably.  Some sort of 
organization is critical to having impacts on a large scale, but the alternatives offered by these 
cases cover a wide spectrum. We have focused in Table 4 on two aspects of organizational 
arrangements: (1) operational organization, which refers to the actors (e.g. staff, volunteers…) 
involved in the implementation of the initiative’s fundamental activities, and (2) external 
relations, which refer to connections with actors outside the organization who are essential to its 
strategy.  
Table 4: Organizational Arrangements 
 Operational Organization Priorities on External Relations 
Build Capacity 
BRAC Size:  Very Large. Staff delivers programs. 
Systems: High. Comprehensive delivery structure, strong 
financial systems, many feedback systems. 
Staff: High.  Commits significant budget for training, 
promotes from within, highly values education. 
M&E:: High. Formal research and evaluation unit provides 
impact information for all programs. 
High Priority: 
• Village organizations and federations of poor 
• Resource providers: Donor coalitions 
• Government partners in program delivery 
Medium priority: 
• Alliances with other NGOs 
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Six-S Size:  Small. Staff works with local activists. 
Systems: Medium. Councils and zones oversee grant 
making. Little data on financial, technical systems. 
Staff: High. Train staff and trainers for local work.  
M&E: Medium. No formal evaluation unit but does track 
beneficiary and impact data. 
High Priority: 
• Village organizations of poor for projects 
• Donors that support undefined projects 
Medium Priority: 
• Government actors related to work 
Greenbelt 
Move- 
ment 
Size:  Small. Staff works with village representatives. 
Systems: Low.  Strong leader, lack of middle management. 
Weak financial and planning systems. 
Staff: Medium/Low. Training for field levels but not at 
middle and upper management levels. 
M&E: Low. Weak systems for tracking impact data.  No 
formal research and evaluation unit. 
High Priority: 
• Village organizations of poor  
• Police, government, abuser targets 
Medium Priority 
• Alliances with other stakeholders 
Low Priority: 
• Resource providers for future support  
Share Package  
Grameen 
Bank 
Size:  Very Large.  Staff delivers services to borrowers. 
Systems: High.  Comprehensive micro lending and other 
service delivery, strong financial systems.  Other 
enterprises have separate management systems. 
Staff: High/Medium. Train staff, but no formal system. 
M&E: High.  Research and evaluation unit tracks data on 
micro-lending/credit activities.   
High Priority: 
• Village borrower groups that use package 
• Agencies that deliver the package elsewhere 
• Resource providers that fund package 
Medium Priority 
 
• Government actors on financial services 
Plan 
Puebla 
Size:  Small. Staff and consultants develop package. 
Systems: Medium. Management relies on technical 
consultants; bureaucratized after government takeover.  
Staff: Low. No formal staff development. 
M&E: High. Initial leaders committed to research and 
evaluation activity. 
High Priority: 
• Village-level subsistence farmers of maize 
• Agencies that deliver package 
Medium Priority  (late) 
• Government agencies interested in maize 
Build Movement 
High- 
lander 
Center 
Size:  Small. Staff provides TA to activists and allies. 
Systems: Medium. History of weak management systems, 
recent two decades of improvement.   
Staff: Medium/Low. Little attention to staff development.   
M&E: Medium. No formal tracking systems until research 
evaluation function started in 1980s.   
High Priority: 
• Grassroots partners (poor and marginalized) 
• Allies in influence campaigns 
• Corporations, police, elite targets 
Medium priority 
• Resource providers outside movement 
SEWA Size:  Large. Staff works with members on campaigns and 
to deliver services. 
Systems: High. Well-developed governance and 
management systems.  Organizing done by trade. 
Staff: High. Training from SEWA Academy. 
M&E: High. Academy research and documentation. 
High Priority: 
• Potential members (self-employed women) 
• Allies in policy campaigns 
• Target actors: police, policy makers, etc. 
Medium Priority 
• Resource providers outside movement 
 
The organization and management literatures are full of discussions about the best ways to 
organize to carry out various tasks, and similar analysis have also been applied to development 
programs  (e.g. Paul, 1982; Jain, 1994).  We might expect that the different forms of innovation – 
building local capacity, sharing packages, and building movements—would require different 
arrangements for operational organization.  We have focused on four aspects of operational 
organization that appear to be important to the success of these innovations:  size, management 
systems, staff development, and monitoring and evaluating activity.   
The initiatives displayed in Table 4 are extremely diverse in their operational organizations, as 
described in the first column. Their size ranges from tens of thousands to dozens.  This diversity 
in size does not appear to be organized by the type of initiative: There are very large or very 
small core organizations in all three categories.  In some cases, expansion has taken the form of a 
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large organization whose operations affect hundreds of thousands of people, such as SEWA, 
Grameen Bank, and BRAC.  In others, the initiative cooperates with networks of local actors to 
carry out program activities, as do Six-S, GBM or Plan Puebla. In still others, the initiative 
becomes a resource to larger movement organizations, as Highlander did with the labor and civil 
rights movements. In the latter two approaches, the initiative may remain quite small, since the 
expansion of program impacts depends on their allies rather their direct operational capacities.  
 
These initiatives also vary considerably in the attention they have devoted to building their 
organizational capacity, on such dimensions as management systems, staff development, and 
performance evaluation systems. Some, like BRAC, GB, and SEWA, have invested heavily in 
management systems—such as financial and technical systems, clear divisions of responsibility, 
and leadership succession plans—that are critically important to running large agencies.  Others, 
like Highlander or the GBM, have focused much less attention on management and management 
systems.  The initiatives vary considerably in their attention to staff development systems as 
well. The organizations with largest staffs – BRAC, GB and SEWA – also have a strong 
commitment to staff development. PP and HREC are less explicitly invested in staff 
development, in part because they do not have to recruit as many initially low-skilled workers to 
fill out a large organizational complement. For similar reasons, the initiatives also vary 
substantially in their development of performance evaluation systems.  BRAC, GB, SEWA, and 
Plan Puebla have all developed such systems; the other initiatives track some impact data but 
lack a more comprehensive system.  In general, the creation of sophisticated organizational 
systems and arrangements is correlated with organizational size in Table 4 – the larger the 
organization, the more resources it tends to devote to organizational arrangements. Developing 
operational capacity is associated with building larger and more sophisticated core organizations 
for some kinds of scaling up. 
 
Hypothesis 6a: Social entrepreneurship initiatives may expand their operations by: 
! Organizational growth to expand the coverage of their programs 
! Small organization in alliance with clients; and 
! Small organization that offers technical assistance to larger organizations. 
 
Hypothesis 6b. Social entrepreneurship initiatives that expand their impacts by 
organizational growth must invest in management, staff development, and monitoring 
and evaluation systems.  
 
For many of these initiatives, external relations have become increasingly important as the 
initiative has become more visible and potentially controversial.  Key external stakeholders 
include (1) constituents intended to benefit from the initiative (poor and marginalized people), 
(2) resource providers who offer financial, technical or political resources, (3) allies who help 
carry out programs, and (4) actors who are targets of programs or campaigns.    
 
It appears from the column on the right of Table 4 that the priorities assigned to external actors 
vary across forms of innovation.  For initiatives focused on building local capacity, for example, 
external relations with client groups are high priority across all the cases, though they vary in the 
priority they accord to other external stakeholders.  For BRAC, the most successful example of 
capacity-building, relations with coalitions of resource providers and with allies in delivering 
programs have high priority. Six-S has worked closely with donors, but has paid less attention to 
government actors. The Greenbelt Movement has not built close relations with resource 
providers (and so has compromised its growth and sustainability), but it has paid attention to 
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policy influence targets.  Capacity building programs need links to resource providers as well as 
close relations to client groups to expand their programs. 
 
Innovations that focus on package adoption place high priority on finding stakeholders that can 
use their packages.  Some expand their own organizations to broaden coverage, like the Grameen 
Bank’s operations in Bangladesh; others ally with other organizations to make the package 
available, like Plan Puebla or the Grameen Bank outside of Bangladesh. Package development 
may be supported by resource providers that differ from those that support dissemination, as in 
the case of Plan Puebla—private donors supported package development and then the 
government supported dissemination.  Packages are designed to be adopted by other 
organizations more easily than capacity building programs. 
 
External relations activities for movement building initiatives focus more on building relations 
with allies and finding ways to influence targets than relations with resource-providers. 
Mobilizing political support from allies and members is more important to movement success 
than access to the resources central to capacity-building or to package development and 
dissemination.  SEWA, for example, is more concerned with mobilizing effective campaigns and 
gaining credibility with key targets than with mobilizing extensive financial support. Highlander 
focuses on relations with movement allies and grassroots partners more than on building 
extensive donor relations.  The success of movements depends more on widespread political 
support than on financial or technical resources.   
 
Hypothesis 7: External relations of social entrepreneurship initiatives vary across 
innovation forms: 
• Capacity building emphasizes attention to local constituents and resource providers; 
• Package dissemination emphasizes attention to package users and disseminators; and  
• Movement building emphasizes attention to members, allies, and target actors.   
 
Scaling Up and Social Transformation 
 
The patterns of scaling up and the social transformation impacts of these cases are summarized 
in Table 5.  While all of these initiatives have been successful in expanding their impacts to some 
degree (or they would not have been selected for this study), there are substantial differences in 
the extent to which they have been able to expand and sustain their impacts.   
 
Prior analyses of scaling up have identified three major patterns for widening the impacts of 
successful social entrepreneurship initiatives: (1) expanding coverage to provide services and 
benefits to more people, (2) expanding functions and services to provide broader impacts to 
primary stakeholders, and (3) activities that change the behavior of other actors with wide 
impacts and so indirectly scaling up impacts (Uvin, 1995; Uvin, Jain and Brown, 2000).  The 
first column of Table 5 focuses on the use of such different strategies for scaling up by these 
initiatives.   
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Table 5: Scaling Up and Social Transformation Impacts 
 Scaling Up Strategy Transformation Leverage Overall Impact of the 
Initiative 
Build Local Capacity 
BRAC ! Develop programs for 
village development;  
! Expand coverage by 
expanding organization 
Cultural: Organize village 
capacity for action on 
development problems; 
Economic: Micro-credit for 
business 
Reach: High 
Transformation:  
! Economic—High 
! Political—Low 
! Cultural—High 
Six-S ! Develop programs to 
prepare villages; 
! Expand coverage by 
building larger network 
of local partners 
Cultural: Build village capacity 
to manage own development 
projects; 
Economic: Jobs for young 
people in dry season; new 
resources 
Reach: High 
Transformation:  
! Economic—Medium 
! Political—Low  
! Cultural—High 
Greenbelt 
Move- 
ment 
! Develop program for 
skill building with 
village groups; 
! Expand coverage by 
training more villages 
Cultural: Organize village for 
tree-planting, other local 
problem-solving; 
Political: Local organization for 
voice on key issues 
Reach: Medium 
Transformation:  
! Economic—Low  
! Political— Medium/Low  
! Cultural—Medium 
Share Package 
Grameen 
Bank 
! Create and test micro-
credit package; 
! Expand coverage via 
large organization 
! Follow-up with support 
functions 
Economic: Provide capital for 
small business development 
Cultural: Support women in new 
economic and business roles 
 
Reach: High 
Transformation:  
! Economic—High 
! Political—Low 
! Cultural—Medium 
Plan 
Puebla 
! Create new maize 
technology 
! Expand coverage via 
government service;  
! Support functions as 
needed 
Economic: Increase farmer 
productivity 
 
Reach: Medium 
Transformation:  
! Economic—High 
! Political—Low  
! Cultural—Low 
Build Movement 
High- 
lander 
Center 
! Build grassroots 
education program on 
movement issues 
! Expand by giving adult 
education services to 
larger movement actors 
Political: Empower local actors 
to exert political voice. 
Cultural: Improve civic 
engagement; reduce racial 
violence and prejudice  
Reach: High 
Transformation:  
! Economic—Low 
! Political—High  
! Cultural—High 
 
SEWA ! Mobilize members for 
policy influence 
campaigns;  
! Provide support services 
otherwise not available 
to members 
Political: Empower poor women 
for voice on harassment; 
Economic: Improve business 
climate for self-employed 
women 
Cultural: Legitimate new roles 
and choices for poor women 
Reach: High 
Transformation:  
! Economic—High/Medium 
! Political—High  
! Cultural—High 
 
 
The choice of scaling up strategy appears to be related to the form of the innovation.  For 
capacity-building programs, for example, initiatives first developed a combination of services 
and functions that enhanced village or group capabilities for self-help or asset use, and then 
expanded their activities to cover many client groups with that combination.  Thus, BRAC, Six 
S, and the Greenbelt Movement all developed programs of activities that enhanced client group 
capacities, and then scaled up the delivery of those programs to serve large populations of 
villages or groups.  The package dissemination programs, in contrast, have created more 
narrowly-defined interventions that can be applied to individuals, so the Grameen Bank can 
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make small loans to a village residents and Plan Puebla can improve the maize technology of a 
few subsistence farmers without affecting the rest of the village.  For package disseminating 
initiatives, a range of follow-up services may come after the package delivery, as in the various 
supplementary services provided by Grameen and Plan Puebla.  For movement building 
initiatives, the scaling up impacts often depends on the actions of other actors, such as policy 
influence targets or campaign allies affected by the initiative’s work.  Thus, Highlander provides 
technical assistance to union and civil rights movements, and SEWA campaigns with many other 
actors to reshape the policies of municipal governments or national policy-makers.   
 
Hypothesis 8: Scaling up strategies vary across forms of social entrepreneurship: 
• Capacity building initiatives build on local concerns and assets to increase capacities 
for group self-help, and then scale up coverage to a wider range of clients; 
• Package dissemination initiatives scale up coverage with service easily delivered to 
individuals or small groups by low-skill staff or affiliates; and  
• Movement building initiatives expand and indirectly impact campaigns and alliances 
to influence the activities of targets or allies.   
 
The second and third columns of Table 5 briefly describe the social transformation leverage and 
impacts of these initiatives.  By transformation leverage, we refer to different arenas of primary 
stakeholder experience that can be affected by socially entrepreneurial ventures.  Thus, for some 
initiatives, the primary arena of innovation impacts is economic, as in the provision of heretofore 
unavailable working capital by the Grameen Bank.   In initiatives characterized by economic 
leverage, the first impacts of social transformation are likely to be visible in changing incomes 
and economic status of primary stakeholders.  For other initiatives, the primary transformation 
leverage is in the political arena, as in SEWA’s mobilization of street vendors to protect 
themselves from abuse by municipal police and bureaucrats.  Initiatives that utilize political 
leverage may produce changes in policy formulation and implementation as critical initial 
impacts.  For still other initiatives, the transformation leverage is primarily cultural, as in the 
changes in norms, roles and expectations created by BRAC’s organization of women and 
landless people into groups that act effectively to solve local problems. Cultural change 
initiatives can reshape the awareness and efficacy of marginalized groups in ways that 
fundamentally change their problem-solving efficacy and the quality of their lives.   
 
The second column of Table 5 identifies the initial focus of these initiatives for socially 
transformative impacts, and also adds other foci that emerged for many as they evolved.  The 
third column of the Table assesses the overall impacts of the initiative in terms of reach and 
transformative impact in the economic, political and cultural arenas.  The reach of the initiative 
refers to the number of people affected by its programs:  “Low” reach indicates an impact on 
10,000 or fewer people; “medium” indicates impact on 10,000 to 1,000,000 people; and “high” 
indicates impacts on more than 1,000,000 people.  Since these cases are chosen as successes, it is 
not surprising that most have reached more than 10,000 people, and many have reached more 
than 1,000,000.   
 
In the second column of Table 5, activities with leverage for economic transformation are very 
common – five of the seven initiatives made use of them, as might be expected for programs 
focused on poor and marginalized populations.  Leverage from economic interventions is 
particularly characteristic of the package delivery initiatives.  Relatively easily disseminated 
packages have been developed for improving individual economic results.  Thus, the Grameen 
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Bank focused initially on micro-lending that enhanced the viability and growth of micro-
enterprises for millions of poor entrepreneurs.  It also quite quickly developed further services 
that fostered cultural changes for its borrowers.  Plan Puebla provided subsistence farmers with 
improved technology for maize growing, and so fundamentally improved their economic status.  
Activities with potential for economic transformation were used, though not primarily, across 
many initiatives: BRAC, SEWA, and Six-S all carried out programs focused on economic 
change as well as their primary programs.   
 
Leverage for political transformation was less commonly used, though it was the primary initial 
focus for both the movement-building initiatives, which were particularly concerned with  
increasing the voice of marginalized groups in critical decisions that affected their lives.  The 
Highlander Center, for example, focused on educational interventions to empower local actors 
struggling with powerful adversaries, such as mining corporations or the white power structure.  
SEWA mobilized women in the informal sector to influence decision-makers in many contexts.  
Political transformation was less seldom visible as a potential outcome for other initiatives: The 
Greenbelt Movement emphasizes political voice as a possible outcome, but it is less visible as an 
interest of other initiatives. 
 
Finally, activities that used leverage for cultural transformation were also common across many 
initiatives, but particularly characteristic of capacity building initiatives.  The village capacity 
building programs of BRAC, for example, alter the capacity of marginalized groups, particularly 
poor women, to act on local problems and to build sustainable livelihoods.  Participation in these 
programs allows them to work on local issues while it also implicitly reshapes cultural 
assumptions about the roles and appropriate behaviors of women.  Six-S builds village 
organizations and capacities to solve problems they identify, and particularly problems that 
undermine the viability of village life in the dry season.  Changes in village infrastructure are 
paralleled by changes in the residence patterns and sense of efficacy of those who no longer have 
to leave during the dry season. The Greenbelt Movement uses organizing for tree planting to 
provide a generalizable model for village organization and voice on local problems.  Many local 
capacity building initiatives have impacts on economic or political arenas as well – but reshaping 
cultural assumptions and norms about how to take initiatives, use local assets, and solve their 
problems appears to be characteristic of this form.  
 
The third column of Table 5 suggests that the overall impact of these initiatives tends to be 
closely associated with the transformation leverage emphasized by their initial activities and by 
their form of innovation.  Thus the economic leverage of the package-based initiatives was 
reflected in high impacts in the economic realm.  The capacity building initiatives had high 
impacts on cultural transformation in two of the three cases, though the Greenbelt Movement 
appeared to only medium impact in that arena.  The movement building initiatives had high 
impacts in the political sphere, as would be expected from their primary leverage, but they also 
had high impacts in the cultural arena, perhaps because political success by such marginalized 
groups would necessarily reflect changes in cultural norms and expectations associated with their 
previous passivity.   
 
Hypothesis 9: Social transformation leverage and impacts vary across forms of social 
entrepreneurship: 
• Capacity building initiatives that alter local norms, roles, and expectations can 
transform the cultural contexts in which marginalized groups live; 
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• Package distribution initiatives that provide tools and resources to enhance individual 
productivity can transform their economic circumstances; and 
•  Movement building initiatives that increase the voice of marginalized groups can 
transform their political contexts and their ability to influence key decisions. 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this research has been to identify common patterns across a small set of 
successful social entrepreneurship initiatives. The data suggests several patterns, which we have 
framed as preliminary hypotheses.  Three general observations are important to further learning 
about social entrepreneurship and social transformation.   
 
First, we recognized differences across the seven cases in the forms taken by the innovations.  
The characteristics of the three forms we identified—building local capacity, disseminating a 
package, and building a movement—are quite different.  To our knowledge, these patterns have 
not been identified as clearly in other studies of social entrepreneurship.  Identifying other forms 
and clarifying the differences among these three are important avenues for further exploration.  
The more we know about the range of forms that social entrepreneurship may take, and the 
contexts within which such forms are effective, the more it will be possible to design initiatives 
to fit circumstances in the future.   
 
These data already suggest that there are important correlates of the choice of innovation form.  
Capacity building initiatives were associated with attention to local groups and resource 
providers, an emphasis on scaling up by group organizing and cultural change leverage, and 
transformational impacts on cultural norms and expectations.  Package dissemination initiatives 
paid attention to user and disseminator stakeholders, emphasized scaling up through packaged 
services to individuals that enabled their use of economic leverage, and had transformational 
impacts on economic outcomes.  Movement building initiatives emphasized external relations 
with allies and political targets, used indirect scaling up strategies that affect large-scale actors, 
and used political leverage to have transformational impacts on both political and cultural 
contexts.  Further research might clarify how these differences and other attributes of different 
forms of social entrepreneurship innovations can shape outcomes and success in different 
contexts.   
 
Second, the data also suggest that some factors are common across initiatives, regardless of 
innovation form. Thus, all the initiatives were organized to mobilize and build upon the assets of 
the poor constituencies they served, and so were able to turn relatively small investments in 
sustainable activity resourced in large part by poor and marginalized groups.  In addition, the 
leadership capacities for bridging and adaptive leadership appeared to be present in most 
successful leadership teams across all three forms of innovation.  Leaders must identify the key 
stakeholders that will both assist them and challenge them in creating the kind of 
transformational change they envision, and they must develop strategies for overcoming the 
challengers and strengthening the allies, whether they lead capacity building innovations, 
package delivery programs, or build larger movements. 
 
All three innovation forms demonstrated the potential for reaching millions of people and 
catalyzing high levels of social transformation in at least one (and often more than one) of the 
   22 
cultural, economic or political arenas.  Four initiatives – BRAC, Grameen Bank, SEWA, and 
Highlander– were characterized by both high reach (millions of people) and high transformation 
impacts.  In the first two cases, the initiatives over time created increasingly large and 
sophisticated NGOs as vehicles for expanding their impacts.  In the third, SEWA created local, 
national and eventually international alliances of membership organizations to mobilize women 
in the informal sector and respond to their concerns.  In the fourth case, the Highlander Center 
remained small and organizationally unsophisticated – but it built close alliances with much 
larger and more organizationally complex movements that could use its support to affect major 
political and cultural changes.  High reach and high transformational impact may be achieved 
through many organizational arrangements, depending on the issues and the roles to be played in 
expanding the initiative.   
 
This exploration leaves many questions unanswered, of course.  We do not know, for example, 
when or how strategically timed financial support can make a pivotal difference to the 
emergence of a successful social innovation, though the importance of leadership bridging 
capacity suggests that initiatives may greatly benefit from early access to financial, technical and 
political support.  We do not know what contextual patterns encourage or hinder the emergence 
of different kinds of innovations, though it is probably not accidental that the two movement 
building initiatives in our cases emerged in India and the United States, where the dominant 
political traditions tolerate to some degree political challenges by relatively low power groups.  
We believe that these results suggest intriguing avenues for further exploration by social 
entrepreneurship practitioners and researchers.  The intent of this analysis is to provoke further 
exploration of the emerging phenomenon of social entrepreneurship – which we believe can 
make a great difference in the next century of human and societal development. 
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